- Original Poster
- #1
It seems the BBC click program has started a bit of a debate amongst the cyber security community.
As part of the Click Program, they decided to run a live experiment on the uses of Bot Nets. Apparently they hired a 22K node botnet from a cracker(s), and then proceeded to send what they described as 'spam' to Google and MS systems, to accounts they had set up, from the compromised machines.
After doing this they then set the background wallpaper of the nodes to something informing people they had been compromised.
This is an age old problem, that folks in the computer security world have had to deal with, using fire to fight fire. Normally when a vulnerability, worm or virus is released, people fire up a piece of software called IDAPro, which is a debugger on steroids and allows one to reverse engineer code to see how it works.
Normally one can work out how the penetration is occurring and the vulnerability that is being exploited, and there is often a thought of putting in a cure worm to remove the malware and to patch the system for the vulnerability.
The problem with this approach though, is one of liability and error, along with disguised intention. So, on the whole the practice is quickly dismissed as being the wrong approach by nearly all in the security community.
The BBC are saying they have done this without criminal intent, and to a degree they may be ok depending upon where the systems reside that formed part of the BBC controlled botnet. They say they wanted to highlight the dangers of BotNets and how they worked, but have they really just advertised the existence and the availablity of bot nets?
Was one of your machines compromised by the BBC? And if it had of happened to you, would you be happy about it, or be looking for some form of compensation or proceedings to take place against the BCC?
One of the problems of compromise is that once compromised you can not trust the machine again, it doesn't matter what people say, or what software gets used to try and disinfect, that machine is no longer trustworthy until a complete reinstall is done.
If the BBC has paid for someone to compromise machines, that may not have been compromised (though still vulnerable) then there is a cost in clear up of a complete reinstall, and data intergrity checks.
Most home users are not really aware of all of this preferring to think there is a quick fix that works, but unless you are constantly monitoring and using checksums against installed binaries, configuration and anything capable of causing code execution, you cannot be sure the software, configurations or data have not been further altered, backdoor'd or root kit'd.
So, the compromise itself, much like hitting someone, is the point of cost, you may not be invincible to a punch but someone hitting a punch bag is not going to cause you problems, it is when the punch lands on you.
More info here:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/click_online/7932816.stm
As part of the Click Program, they decided to run a live experiment on the uses of Bot Nets. Apparently they hired a 22K node botnet from a cracker(s), and then proceeded to send what they described as 'spam' to Google and MS systems, to accounts they had set up, from the compromised machines.
After doing this they then set the background wallpaper of the nodes to something informing people they had been compromised.
This is an age old problem, that folks in the computer security world have had to deal with, using fire to fight fire. Normally when a vulnerability, worm or virus is released, people fire up a piece of software called IDAPro, which is a debugger on steroids and allows one to reverse engineer code to see how it works.
Normally one can work out how the penetration is occurring and the vulnerability that is being exploited, and there is often a thought of putting in a cure worm to remove the malware and to patch the system for the vulnerability.
The problem with this approach though, is one of liability and error, along with disguised intention. So, on the whole the practice is quickly dismissed as being the wrong approach by nearly all in the security community.
The BBC are saying they have done this without criminal intent, and to a degree they may be ok depending upon where the systems reside that formed part of the BBC controlled botnet. They say they wanted to highlight the dangers of BotNets and how they worked, but have they really just advertised the existence and the availablity of bot nets?
Was one of your machines compromised by the BBC? And if it had of happened to you, would you be happy about it, or be looking for some form of compensation or proceedings to take place against the BCC?
One of the problems of compromise is that once compromised you can not trust the machine again, it doesn't matter what people say, or what software gets used to try and disinfect, that machine is no longer trustworthy until a complete reinstall is done.
If the BBC has paid for someone to compromise machines, that may not have been compromised (though still vulnerable) then there is a cost in clear up of a complete reinstall, and data intergrity checks.
Most home users are not really aware of all of this preferring to think there is a quick fix that works, but unless you are constantly monitoring and using checksums against installed binaries, configuration and anything capable of causing code execution, you cannot be sure the software, configurations or data have not been further altered, backdoor'd or root kit'd.
So, the compromise itself, much like hitting someone, is the point of cost, you may not be invincible to a punch but someone hitting a punch bag is not going to cause you problems, it is when the punch lands on you.
More info here:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/click_online/7932816.stm